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Judicial Dilemmas in Enforce-
ment of Drug Abuse Laws 
by Alvin H. Goldstein, Jr. * 
In Maryland, last October, a 23-year-old university student 
was sentenced to six months in prison for illegal possession 
of amphetamines, drugs which could have been legally pre-
scribed. At about the same time, in the State of Washington, 
a defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison for selling 
one marijuana cigarette to a 16-year-old boy. A 28-year-
old University of Wisconsin student was given a two-year 
suspended state prison sentence for possession of marijuana 
and placed on supervised probation on condition that he 
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spend his nights for a full year in the state reformatory, pay 
all court and attorneys' costs, and submit to psychiatric exam-
ination and treatment. In Ohio, a defendant was sentenced 
to 20 to 40 years in state prison for selling poinsettia on the 
representation that it was marijuana. 1 In California, over 
40 percent of those convicted of marijuana possession in 1967 
served jail, CY A, or prison terms, and most were under the 
age of 25.2 
It is a matter of public concern that drug laws, including 
those related to use of alcohol, are unevenly and in some cases 
arbitrarily enforced. Equal justice under law is hard to 
demonstrate. 
There are two categories of offenders. Both are reached 
by our drug laws and each creates a judicial dilemma of dif-
fering dimensions. One is the addict who is prosecuted for 
disease-compelled conduct; the other is the non-addict user 
who commits a volitional act in defiance of law. 
In the Maryland case it is reported that the defendant 
was one of seven users jailed that day as a public exam-
ple of what would happen to persons caught in possession of 
drugs, reflecting the court's expectation that its sentence would 
deter drug use among others similarly situated and inclined.3 
However, deterrent effect in this field is virtually impossible 
to prove, and such harsh sentences are better explained as 
intentionally retributive. Mr. Justice Douglas reminds us that 
a prescription for insanity in sixteenth-century England was 
to beat the afflicted person until he regained his reason. In 
America, the violently insane were often sent to prison or to 
whipping posts, or were hanged or burned at the stake. The 
pauper insane were left to roam the countryside to be casually 
pilloried, whipped, and jailed.4 Harsh prison sentences that 
neither rehabilitate nor deter are similarly motivated. 
1. As reported in the New Republic, 
Nov. 30, 1968, p. 11. 
2. Drug Arrest Dispositions in Cal-
ifornia (1967), Bureau of Criminal 
Statistics, Department of Justice, State 
of California. Drug arrests in Calif., 
1968 Midyear Preliminary Survey, 
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Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Depart-
ment of Justice, State of California. 
3. New Republic, Nov. 30, 1968, 
p. 11. 
4. See Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 82 S.Ct. 1417 
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Theoretically, tough drug control laws were enacted to 
get at those who traffic in drugs-the wholesalers and the 
sellers-and to protect those who would use drugs for other 
than medical reasons from being caught up in the quicksand 
of drug use. As a practical matter, drug laws are enforced 
against young, emotionally unstable, non-criminal types; the 
very persons we set out to protect. It is not that the police 
are reluctant to arrest the sellers. Sellers are difficult to 
apprehend, require extensive and often expensive investigation, 
and are not as obvious as drug users. 
Stanford University Law Professor Herbert Packer has clas-
sified drug possession as a "victimless crime" and points out 
that this kind of offense poses more of an investigative chal-
lenge to the authorities than the crime with a known victim. 
Unlike murder, robbery, or burglary where the corpus delicti 
is usually self-evident, the narcotic investigator not only must 
apprehend the criminal but must first uncover the crime. For 
that reason, the defense of entrapment is often asserted in 
drug cases and even a superficial reading of the advance 
sheets discloses that most current search and seizure problems 
arise out of drug prosecutions. The victimless nature of the 
offense compels a ferreting out of the offender and requires 
unique-sometimes questionable-investigatory techniques. 
As Professor Packer explains, "If suspects may be entrapped 
into committing offenses, if the police may arrest and search a 
suspect without evidence that he has committed an offense, if 
wiretaps and other forms of electronic surveillance are per-
mitted, it becomes easier to detect the commission of offenses 
of this sort.,,5 Thus, the investigatory process in drug cases 
frequently gives rise to constitutional questions and places 
an additional strain on the system. 
Traditionally, local law enforcement has had to concentrate 
on addicts and users while leaving the worst offenders to fed-
eral agencies such as the Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau 
of Customs, which do a woefully inadequate job of controlling 
the importation of illicit drugs and narcotics. By and large, 
(1962), concurring opinion of Justice 5. Packer, Limits of the Criminal 
Douglas. Sanction, Stanford University Press, pp. 
151-152 (1969). 
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the community protects drug users by punishing them, thereby 
demonstrating society's failure and the futility of the present 
system. In their chronicle of the common law, Pollock and 
Maitland wrote that, "[I]t is hard for us to acquit ancient law 
of that unreasoning instinct that impels a civilized man to 
kick or consign to eternal perdition the chair over which he 
has stumbled."a In the field of drug abuse (and others) modern 
law is performing similarly. 
Our society contrives to deceive itself. Burdened and con-
science-stricken with known techniques for reducing crime, 
poverty, and disease, we find the cost of reform too great and 
dissemble by creating forms without substance. Humanity 
requires reform, but the community will settle for less. More-
over, the average individual is incapable of the empathy, 
compassion, and sustained interest required to galvanize our 
leaders into the kind of action needed to create a truly civ-
ilized community. The "great society" would have been great 
if only its members had been willing to make it so. 
We are encumbered by hypocritical institutions and pro-
cedures that restrict the courts' ability to control criminal 
offenders: mental hospitals lacking in the personnel or equip-
ment to effectively treat patients, that become little more than 
places of confinement; a so-called hospital for the criminal 
insane that offers little by way of psychiatric care, sometimes 
less than that afforded by a prison; prisons that provide slim 
hope of rehabilitation, except through their deterrent effect, a 
form of aversive therapy which infrequently works; and proba-
tion departments that lack the personnel to carry out their 
assignments; yet, judges regularly place people on probation, 
knowing full well that they will not be effectively supervised. 
Society's management of the drug problem is no exception 
and there is much to be said for relieving law enforcement 
and the criminal law from at least some of the responsibility 
for drug control and taking a truly multi-discipline approach. 
One of the paradoxical aspects of the present system is that 
6. Pollock and Maitland, History of 
English Law, Cambridge University 
Press (1909), Vol. II, pp. 474-475. 
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by creating an illicit market, profits are assured for those 
who are willing to risk arrest and prosecution. However, it 
must be conceded that so long as the criminal law carries the 
major responsibility for drug control, the punitive cannot be 
overlooked as an appropriate method for discouraging the vol-
untary use of drugs. It is not enough to say glibly that we 
punish those we try to protect. What else are we going to do, 
short of legalizing drugs, if individuals insist upon purchasing 
and using illicit drugs and are not themselves addicted? 
Given the physical facilities, the addict can be committed. 
But what about the scofflaw? Most of our recent experience 
with this category of offender involves the use of marijuana. 
We are all too familiar with arguments that are made respect-
ing the relative dangers of alcohol and tobacco and the sug-
gestion that, compared to alcohol, marijuana is a relatively 
mild intoxicant that does less organic damage than alcohol. 
Researchers at Boston University recently arrived at this con-
clusion while at the same time pointing out that marijuana 
is not as harmless as its proponents claim, and that one can 
get intoxicated on the drug.7 A London psychiatrist who has 
been conducting research on marijuana concludes that mari-
juana is even more dangerous than the recent Wooten Report 
would imply and that those who use the drug on a regular 
basis become society's dropouts.s 
Assuming, however, the non-addictive character of mari-
juana, it is readily seen that where this drug is concerned the 
law is not punishing for conduct incidental to addiction but 
rather for conscious, volitional disregard of law. Although 
some might question the wisdom of a law which bans marijuana 
and the propriety of some of the penalties imposed for mere 
possession, it is difficult to respect those who, though not act-
ing under any compulsion, choose to violate the law. 
7. Reported in Newsweek, Dec. 23, 
1968, p. 48. Discussed in greater detail 
in footnote infra p. 653, and in Volume 
162 of Science Magazine, pp. 1234-
1242. 
8. Examiner-London Daily Express 
Report, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 
3, 1969. The Wooten Report con-
cluded that marijuana is a dangerous 
drug that alters mood, judgment and 
functional ability; a good argument, in 
itself, for keeping regular users of the 
drug off the highway. 
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Punishment of Disease-Compelled Behavior 
Addictive drugs, however, unlike marijuana, generate more 
complex questions. The punishment of addicted persons for 
conduct flowing from their disease has constitutional implica-
tions which have been debated in the courts for the past several 
years. The debate is instructive in that it attempts to define 
areas in which law enforcement has a legitimate concern and 
yet should not be overly punitive in its control of the individual. 
There is a Japanese proverb: "First the man takes a drink, 
then the drink takes a drink, then the drink takes the man."9 
It is when the drink has taken the man that the judicial 
dilemma is greatest because we know then that whatever the 
conduct, it is a product of the defendant's addiction. 
Despite the talk about marijuana, methadrine, and LSD, by 
far the most troublesome of drugs-insofar as the administra-
tion of justice is concerned-is alcohol. The President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice reported that of two million arrests in 1965, one of 
every three was for public drunkenness.1o Recently compiled 
statistics in Marin County indicate that, although marijuana 
prosecutions have increased, alcohol offensesll continue to ac-
count for one-third of misdemeanor and felony filings. This 
does not include other more serious offenses in which the use 
of alcohol has been a major factor, or disorderly conduct or 
liquor law violations. While the legal debate has focused on 
the "disease concept" of alcoholism, any drug could be sub-
stituted since the discussion concerns the general problem 
of addiction. 
The broad scope of the judicial dilemma is disclosed by 
two United States Supreme Court cases: Robinson v. Cali-
fornia/ 2 decided in 1962, and Powell v. Texas/3 decided 
in 1968. In Robinson, the court struck down a California 
9. Quoted in Kirbens, Chronic Alco-
hol Addiction and Criminal Responsi-
bility, 54 A.B.A. Journal 877, Sept., 
1968. (Sill, An Adage from the Orient, 
1883.) 
10. Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society (1967) p. 233. 
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11. Cal. Penal Code § 647(f), public 
drunkenness, and Cal. Vehicle Code 
§ 23102, drunk driving. 
12. 370 U.S. 660, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 82 
S.Ct. 1417 (1962). 
13. 392 U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 
88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968). 
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statute making it a criminal offense for a person "to 
be addicted to the use of narcotics." The high court was 
careful to decide the case on the very narrow ground that 
the statute punished the status of narcotic addiction, rather 
than the conduct which flows therefrom. Robinson, none-
theless, represents a clear and unequivocal holding that it is 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment-and therefore unconstitutional 
-to attempt to penalize a disease status such as drug addic-
tion. If this is true, what of conduct compelled by addiction, 
such as possession of heroin by a heroin addict? If he cannot 
be punished for being an addict, why should he be penalized 
for compelled conduct over which he has no control? 
A barrel of worms had been opened. Six years later, in 
Powell, the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation 
in which the statute went beyond the punishment of the status 
of addiction, but reached conduct as well, i.e., public drunken-
ness. In 1956, the American Medical Association had pro-
claimed that "[a]lcoholism must be regarded as within the 
purview of medical practice."14 When Powell was argued 
before the Supreme Court in 1967, the American Medical 
Association was amicus curiae supporting the disease concept 
of alcoholism and taking the position that the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the Bill of Rights renders it un-
constitutional to punish anyone for conduct which is compelled 
by and incident to a disease. The position of appellant 
Powell and of the American Medical Association, was that 
although conduct is involved, it is an inevitable consequence 
of a disease status and therefore an involuntary act which 
should not be penalized by the criminal law. Although this 
position appears to flow logically from the Supreme Court's 
holding in Robinson, that disease itself cannot be punished, 
crucial policy questions arise. For example, what about the 
arsonist whose setting of fires results from pyromania, the 
mentally disordered sex offender whose molestation of children 
is an inevitable consequence of a diseased mind, or the mur-
14. 162 J.A.M.A. 749, 750. October 
20, 1956. 
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derer whose homicidal act is compelled by a form of paranoia, 
not reached by the defense of insanity? The practical problem 
in Powell is less dramatic because the court is confronted 
with a typically petty offense involving alcoholics, i.e., public 
intoxication. Yet, to accept as a constitutional principle the 
proposition that no person can be punished for conduct directly 
related to or compelled by disease establishes a legal doctrine 
that must be extended beyond alcoholism to disease and con-
duct of all kinds. 
In Robinson, Mr. Justice Stewart discusses the relationship 
of crime to disease in terms that make Powell's position all the 
more compelling: 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history 
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person 
to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a 
venereal disease. A State might determine that the 
general health and welfare require that the victims of 
these and other human afflictions be dealt with by com-
pulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or 
sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human 
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such 
a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be 
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . We 
cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same 
category . . . To be sure, imprisonment for ninety 
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either 
cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel 
and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a 
common cold. 15 
But what is a disease? The late E. M. Jellinek wrote that: 
"A disease is what the medical profession recognizes as such. 
The fact that they are not able to explain the nature of a 
condition does not constitute proof that it is not an illness. 
15. 370 u.s. at 667, 8 L.Ed.2d at 
763, 82 S.Ct. at 1420. 
638 CAL LAW 1969 
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The nature of some [diseases] is still unknown, but they 
are nevertheless unquestionable medical problems. "16 
Insofar as the law is concerned, a difficult conceptual 
problem is created because of the volitional aspect of this 
particular disease. Unlike the common cold where contact 
with virus is chance, there is an element of choice in 
alcoholism. Dr. David J. Myerson, a Harvard psychiatrist 
and Director of the Drug Addiction Center at Boston State 
Hospital asserts that, "If you really went on a medical basis, 
you know that a person doesn't choose to have a heart disease, 
but there is a whole series of voluntary actions in the act of 
drinking; and there has to be a choice involved, or else I can-
not think of these people as human beings. In this way, 
philosophically speaking, alcoholism is not a disease, although 
. . . it has by custom been called mental illness.,,17 
For centuries culpability has been based upon the maxim: 
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make 
the doer of it guilty, unless the mind be guilty; that is, unless 
the intention be criminal). Under California law, we have 
codified this principle to require a union of act and intent 
and both must concur to constitute the crime.IS General 
criminal intent simply means an intent to commit the act which 
the law declares to be a crime. California expressly exempts 
from criminal liability those who commit an act "without being 
conscious thereof,,,19 but also provides that "no act committed 
by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less 
criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But 
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, 
motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any par-
ticular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into 
consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the 
time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which 
he committed the act.,,20 
16. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of sponsibility, 54 A.B.A. Journal 877, 
Alcoholism (1960) pp. 12, 55-59, 83- Sept., 1968. 
86, 113-115, 165. 18. Cal. Penal Code § 20. 
17. Quoted in Kirbens, Chronic 19. Cal. Penal Code § 26(Five). 
Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Re- 20. Cal. Penal Code § 22. 
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The present debate, therefore, is not over the person who, 
though not acting under any compulsion, permits himself to 
become high on drugs and then commits a criminal act, but 
rather over the person who because of addiction cannot avoid 
taking a drink, a pill, or a shot. Should that person be held 
criminally responsible for his compelled conduct, whatever it 
might be, or should the state be restricted to civil commitment 
proceedings? 
Before Powell reached the Supreme Court, two United 
States Courts of Appeal, the Fourth and District of Columbia 
Circuits, tackled the problem of addiction-related conduct 
in cases involving alcoholism. 1 Both courts proceed on the 
premise that "chronic alcoholism" is a disease and presume 
that Robinson stands for the proposition that conduct com-
pelled by alcoholism cannot be punished. These cases, both 
decided in 1966, address themselves to the chronic or involun-
tary drinker. The National Council on Alcoholism defines a 
"chronic alcoholic" as a "person who is powerless to stop 
drinking."2 In Driver v. Hinnant, the Fourth Circuit held that 
"the alcoholic's presence in public is not his act, for he did not 
will it. It may be likened to the movements of an imbecile or 
a person in a delirium of a fever."s In Easter v. District of 
Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that "one who is a chronic 
alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held 
responsible criminally for being drunk in public.,,4 In the 
wake of these opinions by two influential appellate courts, the 
American Medical Association editorially urged its members 
to accept the responsibility implied by the decisions and re-
spond to the challenge by insisting upon treatment of the 
alcoholic in a medical setting.5 The judges of both courts 
of appeal clearly invited the United States Supreme Court to 
do likewise. 
1. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 
(4th Cir. [1966]); Easter v. District of 
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 124 App. D.C. 
33 (D.C. Cir. [1966]). 
2. U.S. Public Health Service, Pub-
lic. #730, Alcoholism, 1965. 
3. 356 F.2d at 764. 
640 CAL LAW 1969 
4. 361 F.2d at 53. (Note that 
Driver talks in terms of automatic or 
unconscious conduct while Easter 
focuses upon an absence of criminal in-
tent, though both are based on involi-
tional behavior.) 
5. Editorial, 197 J.A.M.A. 582 
(July-September 1966). 
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Meanwhile, despite Robinson, most state courts adhered to 
traditional concepts. The Michigan Supreme Court, in People 
v. Hoy,6 provides an insight into the kind of reasoning which 
permeates the present punitive approach to addict related con-
duct. Under Michigan law, a person who is charged and 
convicted of a third offense of public drunkenness is guilty of 
a high misdemeanor and may be sentenced to state prison. 
Hoy had been convicted of being drunk in public as a third 
offender and was sentenced to one and one-half to two years in 
state prison. In actuality; Hoy had been arrested over twenty 
times on drunk charges but until this experience had not been 
charged as a third offender. Thus, his previous incarcerations 
were for relatively short periods of time. Hoy's conviction 
was challenged on the ground that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment to 
send a public drunk to the state prison. In denying the appeal 
and upholding the conviction, the court acknowledged that the 
American Medical Association had proclaimed alcoholism a 
disease and that the State of Michigan in the context of public 
health had done likewise. But, says the court: 
it does not follow that the law may not punish a man 
for having a disease. For the law punishes that which 
is harmful to society, and medicine treats that which is 
injurious to an individual's health. Thus, medical science 
may develop a body of information or knowledge on the 
subject of theft or murder or rape and doctors may coin 
words which describe murderers, or rapists, or thieves 
and proclaim their conditions to be diseases. The law 
will regard such definitions as useful only in the frame 
of reference of the healing arts . . . . The law does 
not permit persons by their voluntary acts to place 
themselves outside the purview of criminal responsibility. 
In such a case, where drunkenness is the proximate con-
dition of the offender, the deterrent force of the criminal 
law operates to prevent the man from getting drunk in the 
first place.7 
6. 380 Mich. 597, 158 N.W.2d 436 7. 380 Mich. at -, 158 N.W.2d at 
(1968). 439-440. Cf. State v. Fearon (Minn. 
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The court asserts that it is not the goal of the criminal 
law to cure alcoholism, but rather to cure the public drunk 
of his proclivity to be drunk and disorderly in a public place. 
To that extent the Hoy opinion suggests that the law has a 
deterrent effect and that a large percentage of those con-
victed of first and second offenses never commit a third of-
fense. Of those who ultimately reach the state prison for 
a third offense, the court claims that "after serving minimum 
terms of one and one-half years less good time, they were re-
turned to society as part of a category of parolees who have en-
joyed a 76.7 percent ratio of successful rehabilitation." Taking 
a crack at soft-hearted judges, the opinion suggests that one 
reason for the failure to reduce public alcoholism with a re-
sulting large number of arrests is the "reluctance of the law 
to use the full measure of its time-tested antidotes."s 
A concurring judge points out that a number of diseases 
in addition to alcoholism have been declared to be criminal 
offenses because of the compulsive conduct which is incident 
thereto. He cites as examples: narcotics addiction leading 
to illegal possession, pyromania which produces arson, homo-
sexuality or other sex aberrations resulting in unlawful sexual 
conduct and states that despite the disease orientation, society 
has through the legislatures decreed that a person convicted of 
such act shall be confined in a penal institution. Conceding 
that there may be more appropriate or humane techniques 
for controlling such behavior, this judge could find no con-
stitutional infirmity in the punishment legislatively decreed. 
A further concurrence was on the ground that the defendant's 
intoxication in a public place resulted from his voluntary exer-
cise of free choice, implying that if it were an involuntary and 
compUlsive incident of the disease of alcoholism, punishment 
S.C., March 21, 1969) unanimously 
holding that a chronic alcoholic's con-
viction of voluntary drunkenness could 
not be sustained because his disease-
compelled drinking was involuntary. 
(5 Cr. L. Rptr. 2001; decided after this 
article was prepared.) 
8. "Time-tested antidotes" presum-
ably means confinement in a prison set-
642 CAL LAW 1969 
ting. Life sentences or capital punish-
ment would, of course, offer a more 
impressive "ratio of successful rehabil-
itation." The court does not indicate 
how many of the 76.7 percent have left 
the State of Michigan, their problem 
intact, to feed their addiction in less 
harsh jurisdictions. 
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would be unconstitutional because of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
It is in this framework that the United States Supreme Court 
decided Powell. The trial court had expressly found that 
Powell was a chronic alcoholic and that his appearance in 
public was not of his own volition. The court nonetheless 
held that "chronic alcoholism," however involuntary, is not 
a defense, and the defendant was convicted. Thus, the key 
issue was placed squarely before the Supreme Court: Is prose-
cution of an addict for conduct over which he has no control 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution? The Court 
said No! 
In a 5-4 decision, the high court affirmed Powell's con-
viction. All five Justices in the majority (Marshall, Warren, 
White, Black, and Harlan) agreed that there was not enough 
evidence before the lower Court to support its findings 
that Powell was a chronic alcoholic or that chronic alcoholics 
are unable to control their consumption of alcohol or to re-
frain from appearing in pUblic. Unlike Robinson, Powell 
was not being punished for the status of addiction but rather 
for conduct-i.e., drunk in pUblic. 
One of the five Justices (White) suggests that he might have 
voted with the dissent (Fortas, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart) 
thereby making it the majority, if there had been evidence 
in the trial record to support the state court's findings. He 
agrees with the dissent that Robinson places mere use of 
drugs by an addict beyond the reach of the criminal law 
and implies that conduct may also be exempt if compelled 
by the addiction. "The chronic alcoholic with an irresistible 
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drink-
ing or for being drunk."g He can, however, be convicted and 
punished for being in public while drunk unless it can be 
shown that it was impossible both to resist drunkenness and 
to avoid public places when intoxicated. Since the Powell 
record did not demonstrate this, Justice White felt that such 
9. 392 u.s. at 547, 20 L.Ed.2d at 
1276, 88 S.Ct. at 2162. 
CAL LAW 1969 643 
13
Goldstein: Enforcement of Drug Abuse Laws
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Drug Abuse 
a conclusion is "contrary to common sense and to common 
knowledge."lo 
A poor record and absence of substitutes for the county 
jail would appear to explain the result of Powell. ll Neverthe-
less, we may be on the threshhold of a new era in the deter-
mination of criminal responsibility, based upon the frank 
recognition that neither disease nor conduct produced and 
made inevitable by disease should be punished by the criminal 
law. This is wholly in accord with conventional common-law 
principles exempting a person from criminal responsibility for 
his involuntary or unconscious acts. Since intoxication has 
always been considered voluntary in the legal sense, it has 
never constituted a defense. The disease concept of alcoholism 
and the medical classification of a chronic alcoholic would 
permit a defendant to be found not guilty if he could establish 
that he was a chronic alcoholic, unable to keep from taking 
the first drink and, therefore, that his intoxication was invol-
untary. Under such circumstances, he would lack the mens 
rea essential to the commission of any crime. By this analysis 
we would not have to look to the Constitution and talk in 
terms of "cruel and unusual punishment" to absolve an addict 
from criminal responsibility compelled by his addiction. [See, 
for example People v. Fearon, fn. 7, p. 641, supra.] 
Moreover, in any jurisdiction which adopted the Durham12 
or "product rule" as an appropriate test for the defense of 
insanity, it could be argued that the defendant's conduct was 
a product of a mental disease and, therefore, that the defend-
ant was not guilty by reason of insanity. In this connection, 
it is interesting to note that in the District of Columbia Circuit 
which applies the "product rule," the court avoided holding 
that alcoholism was a mental disease or defect, and instead 
10. 392 U.S. at 549, 20 L.Ed.2d at 
1277, 88 S.C!. at 2162. 
11. "The optimistic conclusion is 
that the legal profession stands ready 
to herald 'a due process concept of 
criminal responsibility' when the med-
ical profession has evidenced 'the dis-
ease concept of alcoholism.' Leroy 
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Powell was not the right defendant and 
1968 was not the right year." Kirbens, 
Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Crim-
inal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A. Journal 
at 877, prefatory comment. 
12. Durham v. United States, 214 
F.2d 862, 94 App. D.C. 228, 45 A.L.R. 
2d 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 23
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/23
ruled that ". the defense of chronic alcoholism to a 
charge of public intoxication is not rested upon mental disease 
as relieving of criminal responsibility, but upon the absence 
of responsibility incident to the nature of this particular ill-
ness. . ,,13 
The reason for this fine distinction is probably a practical 
one since every D.C. alcoholic found "not guilty by reason 
of insanity" would be committed for an indeterminate period 
to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, thus further over-burdening an 
already overcrowded facility. 
Lacking adequate facilities, we are left with the county 
jail which, as the Supreme Court points out in Powell, at 
least offers the possibility of sobering up, a shower, and a 
hot meal. This reason alone probably has as much to do 
with the result of Powell as all other reasons combined. 
Summed up, it spells lack of facilities. Justice Marshall 
reminds us that: 
The medical profession as a whole, and psychiatrists in 
particular, have been severely criticized for the prevailing 
reluctance to undertake the treatment of drinking prob-
lems. Thus it is entirely possible that, even were the 
manpower and facilities available for a full-scale attack 
upon chronic alcoholism, we would find ourselves unable 
to help the vast bulk of our "visible"-let alone our "in-
visible"-alcoholic population. [T]he medical 
profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any assur-
ance that, even if the buildings, equipment and trained 
personnel were made available, it could provide any-
thing more than slightly higher-class jails for our in-
digent habitual inebriates. Thus we run the grave risk 
that nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging 
of a new sign-reading "hospital"-over one wing of 
the jailhouse.14 
The handwriting is on the wall. Unless the community 
is willing to spend the money required to provide humane 
13. Easter v. District of Columbia, 14. Powell v Texas, 392 U.S. at 528, 
361 F.2d 50, 124 App. D.C. 33 (D.C. 20 L.Ed.2d at 1265, 88 S.Ct. at 2152. 
Cir. [1966]). 
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treatment for drug addicted persons and to cease relying upon 
the criminal law to correct all of society's ills, the Supreme 
Court will force the legislative issue by declaring present laws, 
as applied to addicts and their conduct, unconstitutional. As 
the Director of the American Bar Foundation Project on 
Mental Illness and the Criminal Law asserts: 
Judicial determination that processing of alcoholics by 
the criminal law must end will not be a panacea. The 
alternative, however, is to continue the present system-
which all observers agree is futile. To achieve official 
recognition that the criminal process has failed in the 
case of alcoholism is no mean victory in a country whose 
favorite solution for social evils has often been the 
simple expedient of passing a criminal statute. However, 
until society marshals the medical facilities consistent 
with the implications of this recognition, it will be only 
a Pyrrhic victory.15 
Efforts to meet the implications of Robinson and Powell 
have not been lacking. A bill has been introduced in the 
California legislature which would preclude the use of crim-
inal processes for chronic alcoholics charged with public 
drunkenness. The bill requires each county to provide emer-
gency medical, detoxification services and diagnostic facilities, 
including inpatient extended care facilities, outpatient after 
care facilities, supportive residential facilities, and vocational 
and family counseling services. Police would take public 
drunks into protective custody and, instead of delivering them 
to the county jail, would take such persons to an inebriate 
center where they could be detained for 72 hours. During 
this period the alcoholic could either voluntarily commit him-
self or an appropriate official could file an inebriacy petition 
requiring further hospitalization. Hearings resulting from 
such a petition would satisfy due process requirements. Coun-
ties would receive state aid to provide the essential facilities. 
It is anticipated that considerable public monies would be 
15. "Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Search at Law," 7 A.C.L.Q. 2 at 16 
Criminal Responsibility; Logic in (1968). 
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saved since the criminal processes would not be burdened 
with the chronic alcohol offender .16 
Illegal Use of Drugs by Non-addicted Persons 
But what of the non-addicts who are found in possession 
of illicit drugs or paraphernalia? Their conduct will never 
be excused under any doctrine of criminal responsibility. 17 
Only legalization of drugs can protect such persons and, with 
one possible limited exception, this is politically unfeasible, 
medically inadvisable and socially catastrophic. 
Most drug arrests involve users under the age of 25 and 
a large percentage of these (approximately 40 percent) are 
under 18.18 One writer estimates that approximately 30 per-
cent of the 16 to 25 age group in California are violating the 
drug laws. 19 If so, many of these young persons are either 
getting arrested, in which case they must endure a criminal 
record, or they are getting away with it, in which event dis-
respect for law is encouraged and the commission of second 
and further offenses rendered more likely. The popular idea 
16. The bill was introduced by As-
semblyman Alan Sieroty, March 10, 
1969, as reported in the San Francisco 
Chronicle of the same date. The As-
sembly Committee on Criminal Proce-
dure proposes that each county estab-
lish inebriate reception centers staffed 
by doctors and nurses to treat those 
arrested for public intoxication. How-
ever, the proposal would give police 
the option of jailing the offender. 
The Chicago City Council is pres-
ently considering a pilot project for 
detoxification treatment and rehabili-
tation of alcoholics. This would per-
mit creation of a fifty-bed pilot unit 
contiguous to the present alcoholic 
treatment center which now primarily 
treats volunteers. The new project 
would be aimed at skid row derelicts. 
In three police districts 53,000 drunks 
were arrested in 1967 at a cost to the 
city of $1,988,656. It is estimated that 
it costs Chicago $37.50 to arrest and 
process each drunk. 
17. In a marijuana case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
rejected equal protection, due process, 
right to privacy, and cruel and un-
usual punishment arguments and af-
firmed a conviction for criminal pos-
session. Commonwealth v. Leis, -
Mass -, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969). 
18. In 1967, there were 37,000 
marijuana arrests in California. Over 
14,000 of these were persons under the 
age of 18. (In 1960 there were 1,616 
arrests for all drugs including mari-
juana.) The median age for mari-
juana arrests was 20 in 1966, dropped 
to 19 in 1967. (Drug Arrest Disposi-
tions in California (1967) Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics, Department of Jus-
tice, State of California.) 
19. Kaplan; Foreword to Marijuana 
Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforce-
ment and Administration in Los An-
geles County, 15 D.C.L.A. L.R., pp. 
1501-2 (1968). 
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that only criminal types use marijuana is shattered by the fact 
that in 1967 16,161 persons arrested for marijuana viola-
tions had no prior record. 20 
Ironically, the very group society has set out to protect 
through enactment of drug laws (but who nonetheless have 
been victimized by the purveyors of illicit drugs) have become 
the primary targets of the enforcement scheme. Given the 
hypothesis upon which we justify harsh penalties for drug 
sellers-that their conduct corrupts and destroys young people 
-it is unjust, perhaps even cruel and unusual punishment in 
the constitutional sense, to treat as felons the emotionally 
susceptible and psychically vulnerable individuals who fall 
prey to the seller. 1 
Judicial dilemmas in the enforcement of drug abuse laws 
are underlined by conflicting pressures-public opinion on the 
one hand and sympathy for the accused on the other. Since 
there are a large number of persons arrested for marijuana 
offenses who have no prior criminal record, there is often a 
desire on the part of prosecutors, and more frequently judges, 
to ameliorate the harshness of the law. Frequently this is 
accomplished by authorizing a misdemeanor plea. If this 
does not occur, some judges will suffer through the felony 
proceedings, straining to exercise a discretion that the law 
does not provide, while others, believing in the wisdom of 
our present marijuana laws, see the trial itself as an effective 
deterrent. As Professor Kaplan suggests, "The preliminary 
hearing and the trial will often reflect what the judge feels 
about the marijuana laws and about the constitutional guar-
antees of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. And 
20. Marijuana Laws: An Empirical 
Study of Enforcement and Administra-
tion in Los Angeles County, 15 
V.C.L.A. L.R., pp. 1499, 1513; statis-
tics obtained from California Depart-
ment of Justice, Bureau of Criminal 
Statistics. 
1. The Associated Press reported on 
January 31, 1969, that two California 
legislators, one a Democrat and the 
other a Republican, are seeking ways of 
648 CAL LAW 1969 
ameliorating drug laws, pointing out 
that since penalties were increased in 
1960, drug arrests were up 230 per-
cent. (They continue to rise. Nar-
cotics . arrests for the first six months 
of 1968 were up 40 percent from the 
same period in 1967.) The assembly-
men seek new laws which will treat 
drug violations as a public health 
problem in order to attack the demand 
as well as the supply. 
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finally, at the sentencing level, there appear to be disparities 
wider than those to which we are accustomed in the case of 
other serious crimes and based in great part on the feeling 
of the sentencing judge.,,2 Although the exercise of discre-
tion is essential to the administration of justice, where drug 
abuse laws are concerned, the broad use of discretion and 
its many forms raise the spectrum of arbitrariness and unequal 
enforcement of the law. 
We are now confronted with an incredible situation in 
which the enforcement of our drug laws hinders the rehabilita-
tion of those apprehended in possession of drugs. Society deals 
with these persons in an essentially punitive fashion, usually 
ignoring the emotional problems which motivate their use of 
drugs. If the drug user is convicted of a felony, he quickly 
discovers that he is society'S outcast-unable to function 
as an ordinary citizen, and finding refuge only in the further 
use of drugs. If the drug fails to destroy the user, the law 
can be counted upon to finish the job. 
A Proposal 
The penal sanctions of drug control legislation are intended 
to penalize most heavily persons who profit from the drug 
traffic. However, the bulk of those who feel the impact of 
drug laws are users-not sellers-and the emphasis is clearly 
misdirected. Whether society can safely exclude from the 
criminal law the mere possession of drugs for personal use, 
while continuing to impose heavy penalties upon traffickers, 
is a policy question requiring careful consideration. As arrest 
statistics indicate, many of those charged with drug possession 
have no prior involvement with the law. This, in itself, sug-
gests that a re-evaluation of the present legislative scheme 
is in order. Insofar as the administration of criminal justice 
is concerned, one thing seems clear: The possession of small 
amounts of marijuana and other drugs should be prosecuted, 
2. Marijuana Laws: An Empirical U.C.L.A. L.R., pp. 1499, 1505-1506 
Study of Enforcement and Administra- (1968). 
tion in Los Angeles County, 15 
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if at all, as a misdemeanor.3 Most public criticism of the 
manner in which we administer our drug laws stems from 
the harsh penalties imposed upon those who possess drugs 
for personal use. There is much to be said for the proposition 
that, barring evidence of professionalism, that is, the regular 
sale or possession for sale of drugs as a business venture, 
all drug offenses should be treated as misdemeanors, thereby 
relieving the criminal process, increasing pressure on sellers, 
and permitting results more nearly approximating justice.4 
The principal objection to classifying as non-criminal the 
possession of drugs for personal use, while continuing to pros-
ecute sales, is that this might encourage drug use by elim-
inating the deterrent and in turn create a greater supply 
and demand. Yet, to the extent that society utilizes the crim-
inal sanction in the effort to control the drug use, the law can 
and should be humanized and restructured so that offenses 
which are essentially self-destructive may be so classified. This 
would permit the victimless-self destructive act to be differen-
tiated from behavior which possesses clearcut antisocial impli-
cations and serve to reduce the alienation of those who are 
convicted of such offenses. 
To accomplish this, I propose a reclassification of criminal 
behavior into five divisions, the first three comprised of felonies 
and misdemeanors, including most traditional common-law 
crimes. The fourth and fifth divisions encompass victimless 
and regulatory crime possessing limited anti-social character-
istics. 
3. New York treats possession of less 
than 25 cigarettes or one-quarter ounce 
of marijuana as a misdemeanor. Pos-
session of less than one-eighth ounce 
of heroin, cocaine or morphine is a 
misdemeanor (New York Penal Law 
§ 220.05). 
4. A staff recommendation relating 
to marijuana laws has been submitted 
to the Advisory Board and staff of the 
Penal Code Revision Project. Crim-
inal sanctions for possession would re-
sult only when a defendant possesses 
more than one pound of marijuana, in 
650 CAL LAW 1969 
which event he would be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Possession of more than 
ten pounds would be a felony. Anyone 
smoking marijuana in a public place 
would be guilty of a misdemeanor but 
possession of one pound or less would 
be non-criminal. Marijuana would 
continue to be an illegal drug but the 
criminal process and the stigma of a 
felony conviction would be mainly re-
served for those who profit from its use 
(Proposed Tentative Draft, Joint Legis-
lative Committee for the Revision of 
the Penal Code). 
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Classification of Crime 
I Crimes of violence (felony and misdemeanor). 
II Crimes against property (felony and misdemeanor) . 
III Non-violent crimes, not against property, but 
threatening or affecting the substantial rights of 
others (felony and misdemeanor). 
IV Self -destructive crime (misdemeanor only). 
V Miscellaneous petty offenses (infractions only-
e.g., vehicular, fish and game, sanitary code, 
etc.). 
Classification IV, self-destructive crime, applies to the non-
addict drug possessor discussed herein and includes the pos-
session of all drugs for personal use (whatever their char-
acter), paraphernalia, and public intoxication (alcohol or 
any other drug). 5 The sale of drugs and possession with 
intent to sell are within the ambit of classification III and 
punishable as a felony. All class IV conduct (self-destruc-
tive crime) is denominated misdemeanor and punishable 
by mandatory supervised probation of up to three years, 
terminable earlier at the request of the probation officer 
with court approval. Psychiatric evaluation and psycho-
logical testing would be required in all cases prior to sen-
tencing. Confinement in the county jail is not contemplated 
for a first offender unless there is a violation of probation. The 
first offender could, however, be committed to a local facility 
such as a halfway house, mental health center, inebriate 
reception center, or county farm for a period of up to six 
months. On a second offense, the court would be given an 
option of sentencing a defendant to the county jail, in combi-
nation with the aforementioned facilities, if the court expressly 
finds that under the circumstances of that case confinement in 
the county jail would have therapeutic value. A third offense 
(assuming the defendant is not an addict) would carry a man-
5. Prostitution, gambling and cer-
tain deviant non-aggressive sexual con-
duct also falls within this classification. 
"Self-destructive" because such conduct 
is most harmful to the offender-with 
only collateral anti-social implications 
in that it is disruptive of family re-
lationships, causes indebtedness which 
might inspire the commission of more 
serious offenses, leads to addiction, etc. 
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datory minimum thirty-day jail term. The probation officer is 
given discretionary authority to temporarily parole a defendant 
from any facility, including the jail, for out-patient treatment or 
work furlough. If the defendant is an addict, then existing 
commitment procedures to the California Rehabilitation Cen-
ter or the State Hospital should be explored, indeed may be 
required, if the prophecy of Robinson and Powell is fulfilled. 6 
The legislative scheme I propose precludes a felony record 
for the drug user, retains him in the community, and places 
appropriate emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation. More-
over, society's interest in protecting the community against 
widespread exposure to the uncontrolled use of drugs would 
be promptly vindicated.7 
Conclusion 
It is essential to place the problem of drug control in 
perspective and to remember that it was never society's purpose 
to punish as criminals those unfortunates who are caught up 
in the horror of a drug habit. Thus, it is not surprising that 
there is a significant segment of the public who seek, at the 
very least, an amelioration of the criminal sanction so that 
drug users will not be processed as felons-a result that ren-
6. The legislature, through incentive 
legislation and appropriations, must as-
sist the counties-acting jointly in the 
case of the sparsely populated counties 
and individually in the others to create 
halfway houses and county farms where 
none exist and to expand existing com-
munity mental health centers with in-
patient facilities. 
7. On March 16, 1969, after this 
paper was written and in process of 
editing for publication, the Associated 
Press reported that Assemblyman Alan 
Sieroty had proposed legislation making 
possession of marijuana for personal 
use a misdemeanor in all cases, punish-
able by a maximum of 90 days in the 
county jail. The bill would repeal the 
law that requires registration of one 
convicted of marijuana possession and 
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the law which makes it a crime to be 
present where marijuana is being used. 
Possession for sale under the Sieroty 
bill would continue to be a felony. 
The wire service quotes Assemblyman 
Sieroty as saying "it is clear that mari-
juana is not a narcotic, is not addictive, 
produces no physical dependence or 
withdrawal symptoms, and its users do 
not require increased dosages over a 
period of time." Sieroty takes note of 
the large number of young persons 
who use marijuana, thereby ignoring 
the severe penalties attached to it. He 
suggests that "these laws are alienating 
many young people and causing them 
to have disrespect for the law-much 
as prohibition laws did a generation 
ago." 
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ders effective rehabilitation virtually impossible and hope-
lessly overburdens the criminal process. 
Currently, society is focusing on marijuana. Considering 
the lack of evidence that marijuana is addictive or has a 
physically debilitating effect, and the abundant evidence that 
it is non-addictive and only mildly intoxicating, it is not surpris-
ing that legislatures throughout the nation are debating the 
wisdom of substantially reducing penalties for possession or 
punishing only illicit traffic in the drug.s 
There is logic and justice in such an approach. Alcohol has 
been positively identified as a causal factor in the commission 
of violent crime, particularly homicide, and plays a major role 
in over 50 percent of our criminal statistics. Yet, the use of 
alcohol goes virtually unregulated except insofar as the law 
attempts to penalize conduct flowing from its excessive use 
8. Only one truly scientific study of 
marijuana effects has been conducted 
in the United States. This was com-
pleted in 1948 in the Behavioral 
Pharmacological Laboratory of the 
Boston University School of Medicine 
sponsored and prepared by its Division 
of Psychiatry and the Boston Univer-
sity Medical Center. The researchers 
used two groups of human subjects, one 
comprised of chronic users and another 
made up of persons who had not pre-
viously tried marijuana. The experi-
ments were well-controlled with the 
amount of dosage concealed from the 
subjects and placebos used interchange-
ably with marijuana. Five acute nico-
tine reactions were observed that were 
far more spectacular than effects pro-
duced by marijuana smoking-includ-
ing the higher dosages. Most subjects, 
including the "un initiates" thought the 
high dose was a low dose, thereby "em-
phasizing the unimpressiveness of their 
subjective reactions." There is evi-
dence of "reverse tolerance," that is, 
smaller amounts are needed to pro-
duce a euphoric effect as use becomes 
more frequent. With many drugs 
(such as alcohol) there is a need for in-
creasing doses to achieve the same ef-
fect. The study concludes in part that 
"in a neutral setting persons who are 
naive to marijuana do not have strong 
subjective experiences after smoking 
low or high doses of the drug, and the 
effects they do report are not the same 
as those described by regular users 
of marijuana who take the drug in the 
same neutral setting; marijuana-naive 
persons do demonstrate impaired per-
formance on simple intellectual and 
psychomotor tests after smoking mari-
juana, the impairment is dose-related in 
some cases, regular users of marijuana 
do get high after smoking marijuana in 
a neutral setting but do not show the 
same degree of impairment of perform-
ance on the tests as do naive subjects. 
In some cases, their performance even 
appears to improve slightly after smok-
ing marijuana; in a neutral setting the 
psychological and physiological effects 
of a single, inhaled dose of marijuana 
appear to reach maximum intensity 
within one-half hour of inhalation, to 
be diminished after one hour, and to be 
completely dissipated by three hours." 
(Reported in Vol. 162, Science Maga-
zine, pp. 1234-1242). 
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while marijuana possession, with no demonstrable connection 
to violent crime, is frequently processed as a felony. 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice reports: "On the basis of the present 
data, one can say that there is a strong link between alcohol 
and homicide and that the presumption is that alcohol plays 
a causal role as one of the necessary and precipitating elements 
for violence. Such a role is in keeping with the most probable 
effects of alcohol as a depressant of inhibition control centers 
in the brain-leading to release of impulses."9 The F.B.I.'s 
Uniform Crime Statistics consistently report that well over 
50 percent of all arrests in the United States are for alcohol-
related offenses, such as public drunk, liquor law violations, 
and drunk driving, or for offenses which involve drinking, 
such as disorderly conduct and vagrancy. The President's 
commission asserts that the burden on the police in connection 
with alcohol-related problems is even greater than the statistics 
reveal because many cases involving drunks are handled with-
out an arrest and therefore are not reflected in the statistics.10 
In view of the above statistics linking alcohol to the com-
mission of crime, it is difficult to justify the present approach 
to marijuana enforcement, particularly considering the debil-
itating and habituating effect of alcohol on the individual 
drinker as opposed to the lack of such evidence with respect 
to the marijuana user. 
We are witnessing a social phenomenon that Professor 
Sanford Kadish refers to as "the crisis of over-criminaliza-
tion,"ll in which the state seeks to enforce standards of private 
morality as if the public welfare required it. The basic premise 
upon which such laws are based should be reexamined in order 
that the energies of law enforcement will not be diverted from 
9. Mind Altering Drugs and Dan-
gerous Drugs: Alcohol, U.S. Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice, Task Force Re-
port: Drunkenness, Washington D.C., 
U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 
40-41 (1967); in 64 per cent of the 
homicide cases, alcohol was a factor, 
and in the majority of these cases alco-
654 CAL LAW 1969 
hoi was present in both parties to the 
crime. 
10. U.S. Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, Task Force Report, pp. 8-9. 
11. See Annals of American Acad-
emy of Political Science, Nov. 1967, p. 
157. 
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protecting citizens against clear-cut criminal conduct con-
stituting an imminent threat to life, property, and the right 
to live in peace and security.12 
Meanwhile, decency and the United States Constitution re-
quire that we not jail the sick for disease-compelled conduct. 
If confinement is required for the protection of society then 
these persons should be committed in accord with the require-
ments of due process and appropriate institutions must be pro-
vided for this purpose. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring 
opinion in Robinson wrote that the Eighth Amendment, pro-
hibiting cruel and unusual punishment, "expresses the revul-
sion of civilized man against barbarous acts-the 'cry of 
horror' against man's inhumanity to his fellow man. 
We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment," 
he wrote, "if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and per-
mitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age 
of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action."13 
Much of the unrest among today's youth stems from the 
hypocrisy inherent in certain of our laws and procedures. 
Originally designed to facilitate the administration of justice, 
our Penal Code cries out for revision; for a reformation, not 
a rearrangement. 14 Some critics say, "scrap the system," and 
12. Baltimore, Maryland's, prosecu-
tor, Charles E. Moylin, Jr., told a 
Criminal Law Briefing Conference 
sponsored by the Federal Bar Associa-
tion and Bureau of National Affairs 
that there is a peculiarly American 
habit of over-criminalization and that 
this places an intolerable burden on the 
courts and brings the criminal law into 
disrepute. He subdivides the crime 
problem into eight "crime waves." 
With respect to drug usage, he asks to 
what extent we want the law to pro-
tect people from themselves by curtail-
ing their indulgence in drugs. He re-
fers to "victimless crime," an example 
of which is gambling. He says that 
dockets are severely overburdened by 
the regulation of private morals. The 
worst "crime wave" he theorizes, in-
volves petty offenses. He states that 
its cause is not the breakdown of law 
and order "but too much law enforce-
ment." It involves the enforcement of 
local municipal regulations and punish-
ment in conjunction with the criminal 
process of the most minor transgres-
sions in the fields of sanitation, car-
pentry, professional practitioners, li-
censing, hunting and fishing, peddling, 
animal husbandry, etc. "It would be 
an Orwellian nightmare," he says, "if 
we had not slowly acclimated our-
selves to it." Moylin suggests that we 
"rethink the fundamentals" (4 Criminal 
Law Reporter 2445, 2456, March 5, 
1969) . 
13. 370 U.S. at 676-678, 8 L.Ed.2d 
at 768-769, 82 S.Ct. at 1425, concur-
ring opinion of Justice Douglas. 
14. The scope of the revision proj-
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many of these are willing to resort to violence to achieve that 
end. We had better listen, reexamine, and, where indicated, 
reform those areas of law and procedure that have outlived 
their usefulness. Drug control is one of them. The funda-
mental objective remains: justice. The appellate courts have 
endeavored to ameliorate the harshness of unjust laws, when 
the legislature, for one reason or another, has refused to listen 
and to act. But the power of the courts to innovate, even 
when they are so inclined, is limited, and, when exercised, sub-
jects the judiciary to criticism that tends to undermine respect 
for law. Legislators throughout the nation had best respond to 
the challenge while it remains within their grasp to do so, 
keeping in mind the admonition of Francis Bacon that "he 
who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for 
time is the greatest innovator." 
ect in California is uncertain but there 
is in existence a Joint Legislative Com-
mittee for Revision of the Penal Code, 
chaired by Senator Donald Grunsky. 
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